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Idealism: A Love (of Sophia) 
that Dare not Speak its Name 
PAUL REDDINl;' 
My first experience of philosophy at the University of Sydney was 
as a commencing undergraduate in the tumultuous year of 1973. At 
the start of that year, there was one department of philosophy, but 
by the beginning of the next there were two. These two departments 
seemed to be opposed in every possible way except one: they both 
professed to be committed to a form of materialist philosophy. One 
could think that having a common enemy at least might have been 
the cause for some degree of unanimity, but no: the traditional 
enemy of materialism - idealism - was regarded as having been 
long dead and buried. For the Marxists in the then Department of 
General Philosophy, it had been Marx who, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, had 'inverted' Hegelian idealism into a form of 
materialism, while for the analytic philosophers in the Department of 
Traditional and Modern Philosophy, it had been Bertrand Russell and 
G. E. Moore who had triumphed over British idealism at the turn of 
the twentieth. There may have been many things that were atypical 
about philosophy as it was done at Sydney in the early 1970s, but its 
resistance to idealism was not among them. 
Twenty years later, however, there were signs that old certitudes in 
Anglophone philosophy were changing, and in 1994, two books were 
published by mainstream analytic philosophers addressing issues 
central to analytic concern and suggesting that the philosophy of 
Hegel held the key to their solution. These books were Mind and World 
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by Juhn McDowell, which contained his Locke lectures delivered at 
Oxford three years before, and the mammoth work on 'inferentialist 
semantics' by Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit.l In the same year, 
a commentary on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit by Terry Pinkard 
appeared which utilized some of the ideas of Wilfrid Sellars, the 
analytic philosopher who had most inspired Brandom.2 With this, 
Pinkard thus indirectly linked Brandom's social pragmatism to the 
so-called 'non-metaphysical' approach to Hegel found in Robert 
Pippin's 1989 book, Hegel's Idealism, where Hegel was portrayed as 
a prototypically 'modern' post-Kantian thinker in contrast to the 
traditional target of the criticisms of the likes of Marx or Russell.3 
Brandom's claim for the relevance of Hegel for contemporary 
philosophy was not lost on his former teacher, Richard Rorty, who 
described Making it Explicit as 'an attempt to usher analytic philosophy 
from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage'.4 Rorty's description was clearly 
intended to be provocative, but it should not be dismissed. According 
to Brandom, his approach to semantics, which drew on the work of 
Sellars, had deeper roots in the tradition of Kant and Hegel. If this 
claim is true it casts the relation of analytic philosophy to the idealist 
tradition in a wholly new light, and to understand how it could be 
true would require considerable re-writing of the standard accounts 
of both idealism and analytic philosophy.5 I would like to suggest, 
in a very broad-brush way, something of what that re-writing might 
look like, and why it might be important. 
The Myth of the Revolution 
When Bertrand Russell first entered the world of British academic 
philosophy at Cambridge as an undergraduate in the early 1890s, it 
was a world dominated by idealist philosophers who saw themselves 
as working in the tradition of Kant and Hegel. The conventional 
understanding is that all this was eventually swept away by the 
analytic revolution which re-established a distinctively scientific form 
of philosophy that linked back to the earlier empiricist outlooks of 
John Locke and David Hume. While Kantian ideas may have retained 
a place in the analytic tradition, mostly within moral philosophy, the 
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idealists coming after Kant, such as Pichtp and T legel, were effectively 
exiled from serious philosophical consideration, and were more likely 
to be read and worked upon in departments of politics, literature, or 
religion, say, than philosophy. For the most part, analytic philosophers 
have justified their indifference or antipathy to the idealist phase of 
nineteenth-century philosophy with the idea that analytic philosophy 
marked a decisive and irreversible break with idealism at the time 
of its birth. 
This picture is sketched in the autobiographical writings of 
Bertrand Russell himself. Russell's earliest philosophical development 
had been within that idealist framework, but, as he was later to tell 
the story, the revolution against idealism in which he participated 
was sparked in late 1898 by the then 25 year-old George Edward 
Moore: 
It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant 
and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps. I 
think that the first published account of the new philosophy was Moore's 
article in Mind on 'The Nature of Judgment.' Although neither he nor I 
would now adhere to all the doctrines in this article, 1, and I think he, 
would still agree with its negative part - i.e. with the doctrine that fact is 
in general independent of experience.6 
Russell's choice of words in describing the break with idealism 
here is significant. The standard picture of British philosophy is that 
of a robust realism shared with common sense, with idealism being 
typically rejected because of its refusal to acknowledge the 'mind-
independence' of 'reality' or the 'external world'. The eighteenth-
century immaterialist George Berkeley for whom the outer world 
was, in reality, the inside of the divine mind, is held as providing 
idealism's standard exemplar, and the late nineteenth-century revival 
of idealism in British philosophy is often portrayed as the last and 
ill-fated attempt of a Victorian religious sensibility to guard itself 
against a post-Darwinian Godless view of the world and ourselves. 
Against the luxuriant and mystical metaphysics of the idealists, 
fuelled by religious longing, the 'new philosophy' affirmed the brute 
independence of the material world to the human mind.? But note 
that Russell does not refer to the mind or 'experience' independence 
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uf 'reality' ur 'the world' or 'worldly things', but rather tu the 
independence of 'fact', and the distinctness of this way of talking 
can be brought out by the contrast with which commences one of 
the most celebrated and influential texts of the analytic movement, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 'The world', 
writes Wittgenstein, 'is everything that is the case. oo. The world is the 
totality of facts [Tatsachen], not of things [Dinge]'.8 More recently, much 
the same idea has been defended by David Armstrong in terms of' a 
world of states of affairs'.Y It is the idea of a world of 'facts' or 'states 
of affairs' rather than 'things' that 1 want to draw attention to here. 
Contrast Russell's assertion of the independence of the world of 
facts to the well-known reaction of Samuel Johnson'S when confronted 
with the ideas of Berkeley. Boswell records Johnson'S refutation of 
Berkeley's claim about the nonexistence of matter, and the ideal nature 
of every thing in the universe: '[S]triking his foot with mighty force 
against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, Johnson declared, "I 
refute it thus".'lOBut does Russell's claim express Johnson's sentiment? 
Are' facts' the kind of things that one can kick or trip over? Certainly 
P. F. Strawson, half a century later, thought not: 'Facts are known, 
stated, learnt, forgotten, overlooked, commented on, communicated 
or noticed', he claimed, 'oo. They are not, like things or happenings 
on the face of the globe, witnessed or heard or seen, broken or 
overturned, interrupted or prolonged, kicked, destroyed, mended 
or noisy'.l1 I do not want to suggest that such deep philosophical 
questions are answered as simply as this, but I do want to bring into 
focus just how far from Johnsonian common sense Russell's appeal 
to 'fact' here actually is. 
Indeed, when we look even more closely at the starting position of 
analytic philosophy in the early views of Russell and Moore, we see 
that what they meant by the world is clearly very distant from those 
everyday intuitions. Moore describes that which is independent of 
mind not as things, like rocks, or even events, but as propositions, built 
out of concepts. 12 'A thing becomes intelligible fact', says Moore, 'when 
it is analysed into its constituent concepts.'13 Moore was anything but 
loose with words, and meant exactly what he said: the world was 
made out of propositions, which in turn were made out of concepts. 
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As hf' wrote to friend in the same year, '1 have arrived at a perfectly 
staggering doctrine ... an existent is nothing but a proposition: 
Nothing is but concepts.'l. As Thomas Baldwin notes, 'it would be 
a great mistake to regard Moore's early philosophy as a reaction of 
common sense empiricism against the excesses of idealism.'15 One 
might imagine Dr Johnson, on hearing of the views of Moore, looking 
for the nearest large stone. 
Analytic Platonism 
The starting position for analytic philosophy was, as Baldwin's point 
reminds us, not common sense empiricism, but a form of Platonism. 
'I imagined all the numbers sitting in a row in a Platonic heaven', 
Russell would later write of his early post-idealist thought, 'I thought 
that points of space and instants of time were actually existing 
entities .... 1 believed in a world of universals, consisting mostly of 
what is meant by verbs and prepositions.'l6 Russell soon came to 
see this crowded platonic universe as resulting from unwarranted 
assumptions about the nature of language, assumptions he was 
to criticize and make explicit in the course of developing a more 
sophisticated analysis of language and its logical structure. And 
we might think that it was actually these logical developments that 
were responsible for the 'real' revolutionary break with idealism. But 
1 want to suggest that the significance of the 'starting position' for 
understanding both the subsequent course of analytic philosophy 
and its underlying relationship to nineteenth-century idealism cannot 
be easily dismissed. By focusing on the Platonist starting position it 
quickly becomes apparent how misleading it is to view what had 
happened as a simple break with idealism. I'll try do this by way of 
looking at some surprising juxtapositions that have become apparent 
in the context of recent analytic discussions of the nature of truth. 
Augustine famously said of 'time' that, although we all know 
what it is, it is very difficult to say what it is, and much the same 
could be said of the notion 'true'. Attempting to say what truth 
amounts to has led to an array of competing theories, and among the 
current contenders has arisen a theory called the 'identity theory' of 
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truthY Perhaps the theory closest to common sense is the venerable 
'correspondence theory', in which it is taken that a belief or sentence 
is true when it corresponds to something in the world, some 'fact' or 
'state of affairs'. But apart from any Johnsonian worries that one might 
have about the mind-independence of' facts' or' states of affairs', there 
have been other sources of worry about the notion of' correspondence' 
as it is employed here. Identity theorists have responded to such 
concerns by the claim that a thought's content is true, not when it 
corresponds to some fact, but rather when it just is that fact. 
As Stewart Candlish and Thomas Baldwin have both pointed out,IS 
the 'identity theory' of truth seems to be just another way of stating 
Moore's 'startling' idea expressed in 'The Theory of Judgment' that 
the world is made up of propositions. The paradox that they point to, 
however, is that, while this view is mobilized against Bradley, it also 
seems to be the approach to truth actually held by Bradley. Moreover, 
Baldwin argues that Bradley had himself got the view from Hegel,19 
a paradox that has led him to sum up the claims in one paper with 
the following provocative sentences: 
My purpose so far in this paper has been to tell a talc about a largely 
unrecognized point of continuity between those founders of analytic 
philosophy, Moore and Russell, and their idealist predecessors, Bradley 
and, indeed, Hegel. A tendentious subtitle for the paper might even be 
'A Hegelian origin of analytic philosophy'.20 
Tendentious, certainly, but unsupportable? I don't think so 
- especially not if we add another piece into the puzzle surrounding 
the identity theory, the fact that much of the current interest generated 
in the theory seems to have been sparked by the a series of claims 
put forward by John McDowell in lecture II of Mind and World, 
the very lecture in which McDowell aligns himself with HegeJ.21 
McDowell takes the idea at the centre of the identity theory from 
Wittgenstein's Tractarian claim that we saw before. 'When one 
thinks truly', McDowell writes, 'what one thinks is what is the case. 
So since the world is everything that is the case (as he [Wittgensteinl 
himself once wrote), there is no gap between thought, as such, 
and the world'.22 The traditional 'correspondence theory' of truth 
presupposes there is such a gap between mind and world, asks 
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how that gap is bridged, and answers with the idea of something 
mental, a 'representation', corresponding with something worldly, 
some fact. But McDowell thinks there is no gap to be bridged, and 
hence no need of an intermediary 'representation'. To say that there 
is no 'gap' between thought and world, he says, is simply to 'dress 
up a truism in high-flown language. All the point comes to is that 
one can think, for instance, that spring has begun, and that very same 
thing, that spring has begun, can be the case'.23 These sentences are 
used in support of one of the central claims of Mind and World that 
lead him to his affirmation of Hegel's' absolute idealism' at the end 
of the lecture, noting 'we have arrived at a point from which we 
could start to domesticate the rhetoric of that philosophy'.24 That 
is, peel back the 'high-flown language' of Hegel's claims, and what 
you will find, suggests McDowell, is a metaphysically uncontentious 
truism that in no way slights the 'independence' of a nevertheless 
thinkable reality. 
Analytic philosophy was supposed to have emerged in the 
revolutionary overthrowing of its idealist predecessor with the 
starting position sketched by Moore in 'The Nature of Judgment', 
but the central ideas in this essay seem to be the 'Hegelian' ones 
that Moore shares with Bradley and McDowell. How, then, are we 
to make sense of this? 
Here is one suggestion. What Moore intended by the 'idealism' 
against which he was rebelling was the position often called 
'subjective idealism' and which is traditionally represented by 
Berkeley. The 'ideas' appealed to in this brand of idealism are what 
Locke had called 'ideas' - states or affections of the subjective mind 
that he thought of as representing, in virtue of somehow structurally 
corresponding to, the worldly objects that had caused them. Berkeley 
had brought out what he had thought to be the consequence of 
Locke's representationalist realism: from such a starting point, he 
argued, we can find no justification for the inference from the ideas 
to the supposed things that caused them, and his appeal to the divine 
mind was what resulted from this criticism of Locke's inference. But 
in the tradition of Kant and Hegel that had so influenced the British 
idealists, the term 'idea' fIdee] has a quite different meaning. It was 
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the translation of l'/ato's 'LCEU', not Locke's 'idea'.2s Taking Berkeley as 
the prototype of idealism is a bit like taking the emu as the prototype 
of the bird. 
One of the dominant features of the continental Platonic form of 
idealism from Leibniz to Hegel was its opposition to nominalistic 
empiricism, the philosophical orientation of which Berkeley was in 
fact the most extreme example. Hence all the German idealists from 
Kant through to Hegel had rejected Berkeleyan idealism outright.26 
When early critics of Kant thought his 'transcendental idealism' 
similar to Berkeley'S, Kant had reacted with horror, and set about 
rewriting sections of the Critique of Pure Reason to counter this reading. 
Moreover, further developments of German idealism with the work of 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel had been, as Frederick Beiser has recently 
put it, a 'struggle against subjectivism', a subjectivism that they, 
correctly or not, saw as still haunting Kant's philosophy despite his 
avowed anti-Berkeleyan intentions. Beiser lists the intellectual sources 
of this form of 'objective' or 'absolute' idealism that took root in the 
1790s as Spinozism, Platonism, and 'vital materialism'Y Spinoza 
had been the thinker who had overtly identified the ideational 
realm and the material realm, construing each as aspects of the one 
substance, and the forms of Platonism taken up by the objective 
idealists were also ones in which the platonic ideas were seen as 
immanent in worldly things, as in Aristotle, rather than residing in 
some otherworldly realm.2S These elements in turn shaped the 'vital 
materialism' - the idea that matter was not dead and inert, as Newton 
had supposed, but possessed of a type of intrinsic motive force. 
Such views were entirely antithetical to Berkeley'S 'immaterialism', 
but objective idealism had problems of its own, and Hegel had in 
turn tried to re-incorporate within the outlook of objective idealism, 
certain elements of Kantian idealism. 
When this idealist movement was revived in Great Britain in the 
later part of the century, it in many ways still had this same somewhat 
hybrid form which combined aspects of Kant with aspects of more 
, objective' forms of German idealism. The only way to make sense of 
Moore's early position, I suggest, is to say that rather than breaking 
with idealism per se, he was rejecting a form of idealism he saw as 
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RerkeleY<ln <lnd K<lnti<lnj <lnd was embracing a form of idealism 
more properly seen as objective, and as represented by a form of 
non-transcendent Platonism. 29 On the view that I am suggesting, 
Moore's criticism of Bradley's Kantianism was essentially that levelled 
against Kant by objective idealists like Schelling. From Moore's point 
of view, Bradley, like Kant, had not gone far enough in his critique 
of subjectivism.30 
Here then IS my first heretical thesis about the origins of analytic 
philosophy and its relation to nineteenth-century idealism, it is that 
which is broadly signaled by Baldwin in his 'tendentious subtitle'. At 
least in its starting position, analytic philosophy did not originate in a 
revolt against idealism and replace it with a more common-sensical, 
fundamentally empiricist philosophy. Rather, it started with the 
embrace of a form of objective idealism, and a rejection of just those 
'empiricist' elements that, in the form of Kantian subjectivism, were 
thought of as tainting British idealism in general. A few years prior 
to the publication of Moore's essay, London society was transfixed 
by a courtroom drama unfolding at the Old Bailey - the series of 
trials of Oscar Wilde. At one point, Wilde's prosecutor, quoting from 
a poem by Lord Alfred Douglas, put to Wilde the question: 'What 
is "the Love that dare not speak its name"?'.31 Wilde's answer was 
understandably indirect, but it included that the claim that it was 
the love' such as Plato made the very basis of his philosophy'. In a 
somewhat different sense, I suggest, neither was Plato's philosophy 
able to speak its proper name in Moore's philosophising. The 
appropriate name for his stance was, I suggest, 'objective idealism'. 
But Moore's philosophy was unable to speak its name because the 
name 'idealism' had become, and has stayed, inseparably associated 
with the name of Berkeley, and the late Victorian resistance to 
secularism. This confusion has distorted analytic philosophy's view 
of nineteenth-century idealism ever since. 
The Trojan horse 
You might think that what I have said so far still has little bearing on 
the eventual outcome of the analytic revolution. Even if a case could be 
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made for describing Russell and Moore as initially' objective idealists', 
Russell explicitly developed a criticism of what he took to be the key 
errors of this form of thought by criticising its logical presuppositions, 
and he did this in the course of playing a key role in the development 
of the logic used in that criticism - modern predicate calculus. Here, 
it might be thought, the genuine locus of the revolution behind the 
break of analytic philosophy with nineteenth-century idealism is 
to be found where Michael Dummett locates it - the revolution in 
mathematical logic effectively sparked by the work of Gottlob Frege, 
possibly the most significant formal logician since Aristotle. 32 
This part of the story is usually told along these broad lines. 
Moore had talked of analysing objects conceived as propositions 
into their component 'concepts', but both the tools for the analysis 
of such propositional contents into their significant parts, and an 
adequate understanding of the nature of the contents themselves, 
had to await the developments in logic and semantics that were to 
follow. Moreover, it was just these developments that led Russell 
away from the oddly Platonistic starting point he initially shared 
with Moore. The developments in logic allowed this to proceed in the 
following ways. First, modern logic was to show how misleading a 
reliance on the accepted and traditional 'subject-predicate' structure 
of sentences in fact was, and developed techniques for paraphrasing 
or 'regimenting' sentences into their properly logical syntactic 
forms. Earlier philosophies, working with pre-scientific conceptions 
of language, it was claimed, fell into predictable traps. Next, after 
having dispensed with such illusory surface forms of language, the 
underlying logical structure of language could then be taken as a 
guide to the deep ontological structure of the world. This project 
has been carried out up to the present with ever increasing scientific 
sophistication. 
Something like this picture is, I think, the officially 'received view' 
in analytic philosophy, although it is far from being unanimously 
held. It is the view endorsed largely by those who see themselves as 
'realists' and disendorsed by a range of critics who are often grouped 
together as ' anti-realists'. Critics of anti-realism often portray their 
opponents as having something in common with 'idealists' who, they 
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say, lacked a sense of the mind-independence of reality. In turn, critics 
of realism often portray their opponents as committed to a view of 
philosophical knowledge that is incompatible with a view of ourselves 
as natural beings. They often claim that realists aspire to a 'God' s-eye 
view' of the world, and then call into question the relevance of such 
an image for a conception of our cognitive relations to the world. They 
even sometimes suggest that their realist opponents are themselves 
'idealists': if a realist appeals to the 'propusitiunal' structure of reality 
in order to secure the correspondence theory of truth, for example, 
this sounds as if she has projected the structure of her own sentences 
about reality onto reality itself)3 Here then is my second heretical 
thesis - both realists and anti-realists are to a degree correct in what 
they say of each other, and conversely, incorrect in what they say of 
themselves. Realists are generally correct in linking contemporary 
'anti-realists' with a certain type of nineteenth-century idealism 
- that of Immanuel Kant - and anti-realists are generally correct in 
seeing a type of idealism in their realist opponents - the idealism of 
the continental 'objective' idealists. I have suggested a source of this 
latter form of idealism in the case of the starting position. Similarly, 
the Kantianism of 'anti-realists' should not be seen as some type of 
late foreign import into analytic philosophy. My suggestion is that 
when Russell welcomed into the new philosophy the logical approach 
of Frege, he brought within its walls a Trojan horse, filled with those 
'Kantian' ideas that were to become manifest in what Rorty described 
as analysis's 'Kantian phase'. 
It is now commonly argued by historians of analytic philosophy that 
beneath the technical breakthroughs developed during its early heroic 
years there were in play quite different underlying understandings of 
the task of the' analysis' enabled by those breakthroughs - differences 
that separated Russell and Moore from Frege and, more importantly, 
from Wittgenstein. As in the starting position, Russell continued to 
aspire to achieve distinctly ontological results by the use of analysis: 
the analysis of the logical form of our judgments about the world 
was supposed to issue in knowledge about the deep structure of the 
world itself. Conversely, it is often said that there was a dimension to 
the approach of Frege and Wittgenstein, in which moving from the 
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structure of 'judgments' to the structure of the world in the Russellian 
manner was resisted,14 and that this resistance became more explicit 
in some later variants of analysis. Thus Wittgenstein himself, in his 
later writings, Rudolf Carnap and Gilbert Ryle were all to refuse, albeit 
in quite different ways, to draw ontological or, as they often put it, 
'metaphysical' implications from the paraphrastic forms of analysis 
that the new logic had made available. Like Kant, at the end of the 
eighteenth-century, they refused to derive metaphysical knowledge 
of 'reality' from the logical structure of sentences or thoughts about 
empirically real things. 3s 
The thesis that Frege's logic had a Kantian genealogy is held by 
a variety of scholars. In Germany in the last third of the nineteenth-
century, Kantian philosophy had undergone a revival, and Frege is 
sometimes spoken of as coming from or at least influenced by this 
neo-Kantian movemenPfi Moreover, while once it was common 
to claim that Kant had made no contributions to logic and simply 
presupposed the correctness of Aristotelian syllogistic logic, an 
increasing number of philosophers have argued that Kant should be 
seen as the originator of a number of key logical ideas found in FregeY 
Mary Tiles sums up this approach when she claims that that although 
Kant had contributed nothing towards the development of formal or 
symbolic techniques, he was, nevertheless, 'the architect who provides 
conceptual design sketches for the new edifice that was to be built on 
the site once occupied by Aristotelian, syllogistic logic'.38 
In terms of the key philosophical aspects of Frege's approach 
to judgment, Robert Brandom, for example, regards its Kantian 
roots reflected in Frege's resistance to thinking of the structure of 
the proposition as dissolvable into atomistically conceived parts as 
conceived by Russell and Moore. For Brandom, this resistance to 
atomism is linked to Kant's radical reinterpretation of what a concept 
was. While early modern philosophers such as Descartes, Locke or 
Berkeley had thought of concepts as subjective states that purported 
to represent properties of objects, and while Moore had thought of 
them objectively as what was perceived in experience, for Kant, 
concepts were neither subjective states of the mind, nor entities in 
the world, but rather, rules for the formation of judgements about 
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the world, judgmenb which had to be consistent ,,,,ere they to be 
regarded as judgments about a single world.3Y This Kantian, 'rule-like', 
understanding of concepts was to become more explicitin Wittgenstein, 
especially in his later writings, where he advised that in order to grasp 
the meaning of a concept one should look to the conventional, that 
is, rule-guided, use of the word that expresses it.40 
These developments are significant for the issue of the degree of 
continuity ot analysis with nineteenth-century idealism as, following 
Russell, it has usually been accepted that idealism had been plagued 
with metaphysical assumptions consequent upon its naive acceptance 
of traditional Aristotelian logic. Much work would have to be 
done to show the link between Kant's and Hegel's logics, and their 
respective relations to Aristotelian syllogistic logic, for example,41 
but the shakiness of Russell's big claim about the unprecedented 
revolutionary implications of Frege's logic is apparent when we look 
at a single example in this regard. 
In My Philosophical Development, Russell describes the significance 
of his having met Italian logician Giuseppe Peano at the International 
Congress of Philosophy in Paris in 1900. It was Peano who alerted 
Russell to the philosophical significance of Frege's new logic, and, 
Russell claims, it was Peano who conveyed to him an idea that was 
perhaps the key logical prototype for the paraphrastic technique that 
was behind his criticism of the idealists' logic.42 This was the idea 
that universal affirmative judgments, such as' All Greeks are mortal', 
should not be thought of on the model of a singular judgment such 
as 'Socrates is mortal', but rather should be regarded as having the 
'if ... then' structure of 'conditionals', as in 'if something is a Greek, 
then that thing is mortal'. By 1905, Russell had extended this to his 
celebrated theory of descriptions, in which he argued that definite 
descriptions when occurring in the place of grammatical subject of 
sentences should also be paraphrased in a parallel way.43 That is, 
neither should one understand a sentence like 'The present king of 
France is bald' on the model of a sentence like 'Socrates is bald'. 
It was this type of paraphrastic reinterpretation of grammar that 
had given Russell the crucial tools for developing a logic of relations 
needed for his work on mathematics and to oppose a view that, 
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he claimed, was shared by all the idealists: the' axiom of internal 
relations'. But just as the story of Moore's relation to Bradley was 
more complicated than it appears at first sight, so was that concerning 
Russell's.44 The account of what he had learnt from Peano that he 
gives in My Philosophical Deve/opment, looking back over a half a 
century after the events, contradicts what he had written in a footnote 
to his groundbreaking 1905 essay, 'On Denoting', where he tells of 
first learning of the treatment of universally quantified judgments 
not from Peano, but from Bradley.4s Bradley had indeed treated 
universally affirmative judgments as conditionals in The Principles of 
Logic written in the early 1890s,40 and, moreover, he there claimed to 
have derived this analysis by a correction of the more psychologistic 
formulation found in the work of J. F. Herbart,47 a German Kantian 
philosopher of the generation of Schelling and Hegel who had taken 
Kant's ideas in a more naturalistic, psychological direction. And as 
we can see from the recent reconstructive work by Tiles and others 
on Kant's 'transcendental logic', it is evident from where Herbart got 
the idea - Kant himself. 
Frege's logic was a Trojan horse for the introduction of Kantian 
elements back into philosophy after the early Moore and Russell 
had tried to eject them in favour, not of empiricism, but of objective 
idealism. Much of the recent history of analytic philosophy with 
its apparently irresolvable realism - antirealism disputes has been, 
I suggest, driven by intuitions mobilised by these two opposing 
stances. And if we see these resulting struggles as struggles between 
opposing forms of idealism, we might start to see how suggestions of 
an Hegelian resolution of these struggles may have come about. 
Hegel, Sellars and contemporary philosophy 
In their reconstructions of nineteenth-century German idealism, 
Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard have described Hegel as a post-
Kantian idealist who was able to offer a Kantian way out of some of 
the remaining problems characterising Kantianism itself.48 A similar 
formula might be adopted for the Hegelian intentions of Brandom and 
McDowell with respect to their relation to the ideas of the American 
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analytic philosopher Wilfrid Sellars. Roth start from the distinctly 
Kantian-flavoured critique of the 'myth of the given' offered by 
Sell drs in his 1957 lecture series Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 
and then purport to show a fully Sellarsian way beyond some of the 
residual problems of his own philosophy, problems pervading much 
subsequent analytic philosophy as well. This is the move that Rorty 
alludes to with the idea that they take analytic philosophy from its 
Kantian to its Hegelian phase. 
Sellars's critique had been directed at the type of 'empiricism' 
found in Russell's 1912 work, The Problems ofPhilosophy,49 a traditional 
empiricism that clearly sat poorly within the framework of the 
emerging new philosophy. Like the traditional empiricist, Russell 
had appealed to immediate sensory experience in order to provide 
a certain foundation for empirical knowledge of the world, but 
the difficulties of doing this in the context of a philosophy being 
transformed by Fregean changes in logic should not be under-
estimated. Thus Russell had attempted ultimately to secure the 
certainty of perceptual judgments of world-constituting 'facts' by 
means of what he took to be the mind's direct 'acquaintance' with the 
atomic components of those facts. The mind was held to be directly 
acquainted not with individual tables, trees or human beings as 
Aristotle held, but with 'sense-data' - patches of colour, felt textures, 
and so on - discrete atomic sensory elements from which the 'facts' 
would somehow be constructed. But to so construct those facts, the 
mind needed access to whatever it was in the world that correlated 
with the logical parts of sentences, and Russell considered that they 
too were to be read off the world by a type of direct acquaintance. 
That is, the mind can also be directly acquainted with universals and 
the relations between them. In fact, Russell's account of' acquaintance' 
with universals was much like the view of which Kant had be critical 
over a century before as presupposing a type of Cod-like power he 
called 'intellectual intuition', and it is the same target that many 
contemporary anti-realists have in view when they question the 
human aspiration to any 'Cod's-eye view' of the world. Moreover, 
this view had been embraced by Russell precisely as part of the initial 
project against Kantian idealism.50 
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Sellars, who had a detailed knowledge of the history of philosophy, 
was well aware that his critique of 'the given' threatened to lead from 
a type of Kantianism that he endorsed, towards a type of Hegelianism 
that he did not. 51 But I take it to be part of McDowell's intent in Mind 
and World to undermine the very image of the mind and its relation 
to the world that this worry relies on, an image that he see Sellars 
himself as having dismantled. For his part, Brandom's turn to Hegel 
is reflected in the context of his criticisms of the rationalistic account 
of perceptual knowledge that Sellars had substituted for the empiricist 
appeal to the mythical given, but again the resources for this were 
to be found in Sellars himself. Sellars had suggested that we should 
approach knowledge not as resulting from a process of construction 
from atomic components known with certainty by individuals, but 
from the linguistic interaction among those individuals. In Brandom's 
development, we should see human learning as happening within 
forms of social interaction in which members of a linguistic community 
playa peculiar type of language game centreing on assertion. This 
game involves not only the assertion of claims, but also the act of 
giving of reasons in response to challenges should they arise. In this 
game, the players hold themselves and each other to shared rules 
specifying what is to count as justifying a claim, and these rules too 
can be made the subject of challenge and justification. Knowledge is 
seen as social and self-correcting, rather than individual and in need 
of foundations. 
The general course of the path from Kant to Hegel is not difficult 
to discern here. The breakthrough, according to Brandom, lay in 
Kant's treatment of concepts as rules rather than subjective mental 
items - rules that allowed the thinker to make the kind of inferences 
required by the practice of justifying claims. Hegel had extended 
this idea in various ways, but importantly, he had taken the rule-
governed or normative basis of intentional behaviours like that of 
asserting to be grounded in social life. In particular, he had treated 
the normative fabric of these social interactions in terms of a notion 
taken from the legal philosophy of the first important post-Kantian 
idealist, J. G. Fichte. This normative fabric is make up of the patterns 
of reciprocal acts of' recognition' or' acknow ledgement' [Anerkennung] 
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between individual subjects, such as those supporting the objective 
but non-natural statuses of legal 'rights'.52 This view is idealist in 
the sense that a normative status, such as that of possessing a right, 
cannot be reduced to any empirical property or combination of 
empirical properties, but depends upon practices in which rights are 
acknowledged. But given the practice of ascribing rights, say property 
rights, there is nothing mysteriously mind-dependent involved in the 
fact that, say, a particular car IS my car, despite the tact of its being 
mine cannot be understood on the model of its being, say, white or 
four-wheeled. 
We might now see how this normative realm re-introduces 
something like that to which 'metaphysical' knowledge aspires, 
something more than and irreducible to the world of empirical 
'things'. But this is not in the sense of some world of metaphysical 
objects criticised by Kant as implying the god-like capacity for 
intellectual intuition. Take the puzzling ontological status of 'facts' 
for example. In the context of my normative relations to others, I will 
ascribe to certain others knowledge. The content of that knowledge, 
we might say, is just what is the case - it is 'the facts'. But there would 
not be a world of facts in addition to the world of things if it were 
not the case that I had already adopted the appropriate normative 
attitudes to others and, given the normative reciprocity of these 
attitudes, to myself. There is a certain sense in which the normative 
framework of the world in which we live can be described - we can 
reflect on the historical origins of particular norms, and chart their 
subsequent development, for example. But they cannot be described 
as merely factual, as say, an anthropologist might hope to describe 
them, without ceasing to be our norms, and conflicts within them 
cannot be resolved without some sort of appeal to the ones we take 
to be most essential. They have to be described from the point of view 
of agents who endorse them as their own. In Sellars's apt phrase, 
the world from this perspective is 'fraught with ought', and it is 
the ineliminability of the' ought' that I take to be the characteristic 
mark of Hegel's idealism. But neither do the 'oughts' issue from any 
supernatural agent - the divine legislator of norms typical of early 
modern philosophy - they come from us. This is necessary if they 
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are tu be uur:,;. 
Here Hegel tells a story that is a type of idealist analogue of the one 
told by Hobbes, but the distinctive thing that marks his story from that 
of Hobbes is the conception of the will expressed in those imagined 
struggles from which Hobbes had pictured society as emerging. For 
Hobbes this struggle was basically over power over worldly goods 
capable of satisfying naturalistically conceived appetites. For Hegel 
it was more a struggle over who gets to assert the norms that would 
be the ones regulating society and, ultimately, intentional life - that is, 
over the norms that would be recognized as authoritative. As Hegel 
thought of philosophy itself as that part of culture in which a society's 
norms were given their most explicit, conceptually articulated 
expression, he thought of it too as a realm driven by a similar sort of 
'struggle for recognition'. 
Hegel's approach here involved the general type of cultural 
reconciliationism that had been a part of continental European 
idealism since Leibniz, a philosopher working in the aftermath of the 
Thirty Years War. In struggles in philosophy as elsewhere, the trick 
was to establish the contexts which gave the antagonists the sense 
of the legitimacy of their own claims - that is, to establish a type of 
local legitimacy that had been overreached by each antagonist in the 
attempt to impose its norms on the other. The standard way to think 
of such situations in philosophy is to conceive of a goal of an ultimate 
all encompassing framework in which all the local claims could be 
grasped as contextually legitimate in their own restricted domains. 
But such a conception seems to reintroduce a type of God's-eye point 
of view. Hegel's concept of 'reciprocal recognition', as allowing a 
conception of a common content among perspectivally opposed and 
equally 'one-sided' individual thoughts, is intended to capture just 
the idea of such a thinkable content without locating it in relation to 
any single transcendent or divine thinker.:;] 
Thirty five years ago, the idea of a possible version of Hegelian 
philosophy in any way acceptable within contemporary philosophy 
was effectively unthinkable. I hope that I have given you some reason 
to think that perhaps that is no longer quite so obviously the case. 
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